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Abstract
Computational advertising has been studied to design efficient marketing strate-
gies that maximize the number of acquired customers. In an increased competitive
market, however, a market leader (a leader) requires the acquisition of new cus-
tomers as well as the retention of her loyal customers because there often exists
a competitor (a follower) who tries to attract customers away from the market
leader. In this paper, we formalize a new model called the Stackelberg budget al-
location game with a bipartite influence model by extending a budget allocation
problem over a bipartite graph to a Stackelberg game. To find a strong Stackelberg
equilibrium, a standard solution concept of the Stackelberg game, we propose two
algorithms: an approximation algorithm with provable guarantees and an efficient
heuristic algorithm. In addition, for a special case where customers are disjoint,
we propose an exact algorithm based on linear programming. Our experiments
using real-world datasets demonstrate that our algorithms outperform a baseline
algorithm even when the follower is a powerful competitor.
1 Introduction
An aim of computational advertising is to find the best advertisement that can help
build customers loyalty. More specifically, the purpose of advertisers is to devise an
optimum allocation of budgets to media, such as newspapers, radio stations, TV, and
websites, in order to maximize the number of activated customers. Recently, Alon et
al. [1] proposed a model to deal with a simple case of the problem, called a bipartite in-
fluence model. In this study, we shall extend the model by integrating a game-theoretic
framework, called the non-zero-sum Stackelberg game framework. Let us explain the
model more precisely below.
In the bipartite influence model, we consider a bipartite graph where one side is
a set of media, the other is a set of customers, and each edge is associated with a
probability. Intuitively, each edge between a medium and a customer indicates that the
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customer is influenced by the medium with some given probability that depends on
the budget allocated to the medium. We aim to allocate budgets on media so that the
expected number of activated customers is maximized. The problem can be formulated
as a combinatorial optimization problem. Constant-factor approximation algorithms
for the problem have been developed in a framework of submodularity [1, 12, 13].
In this paper, we shall try to extend the above-mentioned model to deal with a
situation of a duopoly where a market leader has occupied the market of a certain prod-
uct for a long time and a competitor tries to break into the market. The competitor
tries to grab the share of the market by aggressively marketing its product. On the
other hand, the market leader wants to gain customers and retain her loyal customers
simultaneously. This implies that the leader’s gain does not necessarily result in the
competitor’s loss. In order to capture the dynamics of this market, we exploit a Stack-
elberg game [14] framework to model the interactions between the market leader and
the competitor. The Stackelberg game is a two-player two-period game, in which one
player (a leader) can commit to an action before the other player (a follower) plays an
action. A standard solution concept of this game is the strong Stackelberg equilibrium,
which is an optimal solution maximizing the leader’s utility under the constraint that
the follower plays a best response to the leader’s action (i.e., intended to maximize the
follower’s utility).
The Stackelberg game matches to model our problem setting because the leader
wants to increase the number of activated customers, and at the same time, prevent the
outflow of her customers, which is achieved by finding a strong Stackelberg equilib-
rium. In a strong Stackelberg equilibrium, the leader plays a mixed strategy and the
follower plays a pure strategy, where pure strategy and mixed strategy correspond to a
budget allocation and a probability distribution over the pure strategies, respectively.
In this paper, we propose a new model called the Stackelberg budget allocation
game with a bipartite influence model, which is an extension of the budget allocation
problem presented in [1]. The difficulties of our game lie in the leader’s utility func-
tion. Our game belongs to a non-zero-sum game, and the utility function is a submodu-
lar (nonlinear) function even when the follower’s action is fixed. It is hard to construct
an approximation algorithms by the following reasons: (i) the cumbersome constraint
that the follower optimally responds and (ii) the leader’s utility may be non-linearly
changed by a follower’s strategy. Thus, existing techniques for submodular functions
cannot be directly applied to our problem. Furthermore, the leader’s utility function is
not necessarily monotone, that is, the utility does not always increase in the number
of allocated budgets. This entails the increment of the number of pure strategies. To
design an efficient algorithm is an arduous task.
In this paper, we propose three efficient algorithms:
• We design an approximation algorithm with theoretical guarantee. The key idea
to construct an approximation algorithm is to create a zero-sum game close to
the original non-zero-sum game, and to find an approximate minimax strategy of
the zero-sum game with the aid of submodularity.
• We give an efficient heuristic algorithm that repeatedly finds a leader’s pure strat-
egy greedily and uniformly picks from the pure strategies. The running time is
polynomial in the leader’s budget. This heuristic can deal with a situation that
the leader should not spend up her whole budget due to the non-monotonicity of
the utility function. We also evaluate its performance by numerical experiments.
• If the customers are disjoint, we prove that a strong Stackelberg equilibrium can
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be found efficiently even when the leader has exponentially many pure strategies
by using the multiple linear programming (LP for short) formulations. The point
in the disjoint case is that we can aggregate a leader’s mixed strategy to a frac-
tional budget allocation. At the same time we can recover a mixed strategy in
a compact representation without loss of the leader’s utility. This enables us to
save memories to keep a mixed strategy and reduce the size of LP instances.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We describe related work in Section 2
and define notations in Section 3. We formalize our model and analyze its (mathe-
matical) properties in Section 4. We then provide an approximation and a heuristic
algorithms in Section 5, and provide an exact algorithm for the disjoint customers in
Section 6. In Section 7, we empirically show the performance of our algorithm, and
finally we conclude the study in Section 8.
2 Related work
Our problem setting can be viewed as a non-monotone non-zero-sumStackelberg game
with submodular functions. Vanek et al. [17] modeled a non-zero-sum Stackelberg
game with submodular functions where the defender (the leader) cares about minimiz-
ing the loss of her utility. In our game, the leader maximizes her utility incorporating
her loss against the follower’s action. Thus, the goal of the leader is different. More-
over, direct application of their technique to find a Stackelberg equilibrium does not
seem to work well in our setting. Recently, Wilder et al. [18] extended a bipartite
influence model to a zero-sum Stackelberg game, which is closely related to our prob-
lem setting. They proved that the problem is APX-hard, while it has FPTAS for some
special cases.
In combinatorial optimization and machine learning, approximation algorithms
for maximizing submodular functions under certain constraints have been extensively
studied [10]. Our problem can be viewed as a submodular maximization under a best-
response constraint, which is more cumbersome than typical constraints in the sub-
modular maximization literature (e.g., cardinality constraint and knapsack constraint).
The budget allocation problemwith the bipartite influencemodel has been extended
in [7, 11, 12, 16]. In particular, some formulations have incorporated the view of the
multi-agent system. Maehara et al. [11] extended a budget allocation in the bipartite
influence model to a strategic form game, called the budget allocation game with a
bipartite influence model. Hatano et al. [7] extended the budget allocation problem to
the problem with two participants; advertiser and match maker. In the problem, there
exist multiple advertisers who cooperatively maximize the influence on customers and
single match maker who allocates slots of media to advertisers.
3 Preliminary
Let Z+ be the set of non-negative integers. For an integer k ∈ Z+, let [k] be the
set {1, 2, . . . , k}. In this section, we describe the budget allocation problem with a
bipartite influence model and the Stackelberg game.
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3.1 Bipartite influence model
Let G = (U, V ;E) be a bipartite graph, where (U, V ) is a bipartition and E ⊆ U × V
is a set of edges. Each vertex u ∈ U corresponds to a medium and v ∈ V corresponds
to a customer. Let n andm be the sizes of U and V , respectively. Each edge uv ∈ E
is associated with a probability puv ∈ [0, 1], which means that allocating a budget to
medium u ∈ U activates customer v ∈ V with probability puv. We assume that the
activation events are independent. The advertiser has a total available budget of k ∈
Z+, and each medium u ∈ U has a slot to which the advertiser can allocate her budget.
The goal is to find the optimal budget allocation z ∈ {0, 1}U with
∑
u∈U zu ≤ k that
maximizes the number of activated customers. Throughout this paper, we identify a set
S of media with its characteristic vector zS ∈ {0, 1}U . A probability that a customer
v ∈ V is activated by the advertiser’s trial from media in U is given by
Pv(z) = 1−
∏
u∈Nv: zu=1
(1− puv), (1)
where Nv = {u | uv ∈ E} is the set of the neighbors of v. The expected number
of customers activated through the budget allocation z is given by
∑
v∈V Pv(z). The
objective of the budget allocation problem with a bipartite influence model is to find z
that maximizes
∑
v∈V Pv(z) subject to
∑
u∈U zu ≤ k.
The function Pv(z) is shown to be a monotone submodular function [15]. Here,
a function f : {0, 1}n → R is submodular if it satisfies f(x) + f(y) ≥ f(x ∨ y) +
f(x∧ y) for all x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, where x∨ y and x∧ y denote the vector of component-
wise maxima and minima, respectively, i.e., (x ∨ y)i = max{xi, yi} and (x ∧ y)i =
min{xi, yi}. A function f is monotone if it satisfies f(x) ≤ f(y) for all x ≤ y, i.e.,
xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ [n]. Thus the budget allocation problem is a special case of the
submodular maximization problem with a cardinality constraint, and it is well-known
that the problem is NP-hard [3] and has a (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm [13].
3.2 Stackelberg game
The Stackelberg game is played between two players: the leader and the follower. Both
players can play a mixed strategy, but it is sufficient to consider that the follower plays
a pure strategy. Let SL and DF be the sets of pure strategies of the leader and the
follower, respectively. We denote the set of mixed strategies of the leader by DL =
{x ∈ [0, 1]SL |
∑
s∈SL
xs = 1}, each of which is a probability distribution on pure
strategies in SL. We define f : DL × DF → R and g : DL × DF → R as utility
functions of the leader and the follower, respectively. We define an instance of the
game as G = (DL, DF , f, g). Let BR(x) = argmaxy∈DF g(x, y) be the set of best
responses of the follower against x. In this game, the leader will commit to play a
mixed strategy before the follower plays his strategy. Thus the leader needs to find
a mixed strategy x maximizing f(x, y) under the constraint that the follower would
choose a best-response pure strategy y ∈ BR(x). More precisely, the goal of this
game is to find a leader’s mixed strategy that forms a strong Stackelberg equilibrium,
as indicated below.
Definition 3.1. A strong Stackelberg equilibrium of G is a pair (x∗, y∗) that satisfies
f(x∗, y∗) ≥ f(x, y)
for all x ∈ DL, y ∈ BR(x), and y∗ ∈ BR(x∗).
4
4 Stackelberg budget allocation game
In this section, we extend the budget allocation problem with a bipartite influence
model to a Stackelberg game. For any set SL and s ∈ SL, we denote by χs a charac-
teristic vector in {0, 1}SL such that (χs)s′ = 1 for s′ = s and (χs)s′ = 0 for s′ 6= s
(s′ ∈ SL). For a mixed strategy x ∈ DL, the support of x is the set of pure strategies
that is played with non-zero probability under x, i.e., supp(x) = {s ∈ SL | xs > 0}.
4.1 Definition
Let G = (U, V ;E) be a bipartite graph consisting of a set U of n media, a set V of
m customers, and a set E of edges between them. For each uv ∈ E, we denote by
puv a probability that a customer v is activated through a medium u by a leader’s or
a follower’s trial, and by pF,uv a probability that a medium u activates a customer v
who has been already activated by the leader. Two probabilities intuitively mean that
puv is a basic activation probability in the market, and pF,uv is a probability that the
follower recaptures customers who were activated by the leader. Let kL and kF be
the budgets of the leader and the follower, respectively. An instance of the Stackelberg
budget allocation game with a bipartite influence model is parameterized by φ = (G =
(U, V ;E), {puv}uv∈E , {pF,uv}uv∈E , kL, kF ).
We construct a Stackelberg game G from an instance φ as follows. A pure strategy
for the leader (respectively the follower) is a set of at most kL media (respectively
kF media). DL and DF of the game G are defined by setting SL = {z ∈ {0, 1}U |∑
u∈U zu ≤ kL} (or equivalently SL = {S ⊆ U | |S| ≤ kL}) and DF = {y ∈
{0, 1}U |
∑
u∈U yu ≤ kF }.
Let v ∈ V be any customer. Let z and y be a leader’s and a follower’s pure
strategies, respectively. The probability that the leader activates v is given by the equa-
tion (1). If v is not activated by the leader, then the activation probability for the
follower is given by the same basic probability, that is Pv(y). If v is activated by the
leader, then the probability that the follower attracts a customer v ∈ V away from the
leader is PF,v(y) = 1−
∏
u∈Nv :yu=1
(1− pF,uv).
Example 4.1. We explain the difference between puv and pF,uv. Consider a game
instance illustrated in Figure 1. There are three media u1, u2, u3 and four customers
v1, v2, v3, v4. For an arbitrary edge uv, puv = 0.8 and pF,uv = 0.5. The budget
for the leader and the follower is kL = 2 and kF = 1, respectively. At first, the
leader plays a mixed strategy x that chooses {u1, u2} w.p. 1. Suppose the situation in
Figure 1(a) where {u1, u2} is chosen and v1, v2, and v3 are activated w.p. 0.8, who
are shown in gray. After that, the follower plays a pure strategy that chooses {u3}.
In Figure 1(b), the customer v2 switches to the follower w.p. 0.5 if v2 is activated by
the leader, and otherwise v2 is activated w.p. 0.8. Thus, the probability to activate v2
is 0.96 · 0.5 + 0.04 · 0.8 = 0.512. In addition, v4 is activated w.p. 0.8 because v4 is
non-activated.
The utility functions f and g are given as follows. The expected number of cus-
tomers that are activated by the leader but do not shift to the follower is given by
f(z, y) =
∑
v∈V Pv(z)(1− PF,v(y)).
The expected number of activated customers for the follower is given by
g(z, y) =
∑
v∈V
(
Pv(z)PF,v(y) + (1 − Pv(z))Pv(y)
)
.
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u1
u2
u3
v1
v2
v3
v4
(a) The leader’s turn
u1
u2
u3
v1
v2
v3
v4
(b) The follower’s turn
Figure 1: The difference between puv and pF,uv.
When the leader uses a mixed strategy x, we abuse the notation and write Pv(x) =
Ez∼x[Pv(z)]. Here, for a probability distribution x over a domainD, z ∼ xmeans that
we sample z ∈ D from the distribution x. Similarly, we write f(x, y) = Ez∼x[f(z, y)] =∑
v∈V Pv(x)(1 − PF,v(y)), and g(x, y) = Ez∼x[g(z, y)] =
∑
v∈V
(
Pv(x)PF,v(y) +
(1− Pv(x))Pv(y)
)
.
The goal of the Stackelberg budget allocation gamewith a bipartite influence model
is to find a leader’s mixed strategy x in a strong Stackelberg equilibrium of the game
G. We define a function fBR that receives a mixed strategy x ∈ DL and returns the
leader’s utility when the follower takes a best response, i.e.,
fBR(x) = max {f(x, y) | y ∈ BR(x)} .
We aim to solve
max fBR(x) s.t. x ∈ DL. (2)
Note that x is an optimal solution to (2) if and only if (x, y) is a strong Stackelberg
equilibrium, where y is a best response against x. We can evaluate fBR(x) for x ∈ SL
inO(|DF | · |E| · | supp(x)|) time by evaluating f(x, y) |DF | times. To obtain the value
of f(x, y), we evaluate f(z, y) for z ∈ supp(x), which takes O(|E|) time.
We now see that the leader’s optimal strategy may not be a pure strategy.
Example 4.2. Consider an instance with U = {u1, u2, u3}, V = {v1, v2, v3, v4},
E = {u1v1, u1v2, u2v2, u2v3, u3v4}, and kL = kF = 1. For a set S of media, χS
denotes a unit vector in {0, 1}SL with (χS)S = 1. The instance including activation
probabilities is depicted in Figure 2(a). In this case, an optimal strategy for the leader
is x∗ = 0.5χ{u1}+0.5χ{u2} and fBR(x
∗) = 1.1where the best response of the follower
is {u1}. However, fBR(χ{u1}) = fBR(χ{u2}) = 0.6 and fBR(χ{u3}) = 0.599.
We next see that the leader may not use the whole budget in her optimal strategy.
Example 4.3. Consider an instance depicted in Figure 2(b) where U = {u1, u2, u3},
V = {v1, v2}, E = {u1v1, u2v1, u2v2, u3v2}, kL = 3, and kF = 1. Also, pu1v1 =
pF,u2v1 = pF,u2v2 = pu3v2 = 1 and pF,u1v1 = pu2v1 = pu2v2 = pF,u3v2 = 0. Then
fBR(χU ) = 0 while fBR(χ{u1}) = fBR(χ{u3}) = 1.
There also exists an instance without a pure Stackelberg equilibrium.
Example 4.4. Consider an instance with U = {u1, u2, u3, u4} and V = V1 ∪ V2 ∪
V3 ∪ V4 where V1 = {v1,1, . . . , v1,10} and Vi = {vi,1, . . . , vi,6} (i = 2, 3, 4). Let
E = {uv | u = ui, v ∈ Vi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4} and let puv = 1 and pF,uv = 0.5 for all
uv ∈ E. We have |Nv| = 1 for all v ∈ V . There exists a mixed Stackelberg equilibrium
(x, y), where x = 13 (χ{u1,u4}+χ{u1,u2,u4}+χ{u1,u3,u4}) and y = χ{u2,u3}. However,
there is no pure Stackelberg equlibrium in this instance.
6
(0.1,
0)
(1, 0.5)
(1, 0.
5)
(0.1, 0)
(0.599, 0)
u1
u2
u3
v1
v2
v3
v4
(a) An instance without leader’s pure optimal
strategies
(1, 0)
(0, 1)
(0, 1)
(1,
0)
u1
u2
u3
v1
v2
(b) An instance where the leader
should not spend whole her budget
Figure 2: Examples of the Stackelberg budget allocation game, where the pair of num-
bers on each edge uv represents the activation probabilities puv and pF,uv.
4.2 Hardness
In this subsection, we show hardness results. We observe that finding a leader’s opti-
mal pure strategy when kF = 0 is equivalent to the optimal budget allocation problem.
Thus, it is NP-hard to find the leader’s mixed strategy that forms a Stackelberg equi-
librium even if kF = 0, since our problem (2) when kF = 0 always has the leader’s
optimal strategy that is pure. It is also known that the approximation ratio 1 − 1/e
is best possible for the maximum coverage problem under the assumption that P 6=
NP [4]. Hence, our problem (2) is also inapproximable within ratio 1− 1/e unless P =
NP.
Moreover, when kF is not a fixed constant, it is even NP-hard to evaluate fBR(x)
for a given x ∈ DL. The proof is reducing from the maximum coverage problem,
which is shown to be NP-hard (see e.g., [8]). Given an integer k and a collection of
sets S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sn}, the maximum coverage problem is to find a subset S ′ ⊆ S
of at most k sets such that the number of covered elements
∣
∣⋃
Si∈S′
Si
∣
∣ is maximized.
Theorem 4.5. It is NP-hard to compute fBR(x) for x ∈ DL.
Proof. Let (k,S) be any instance of the maximum coverage problem. We consider an
instance of Stackelberg budget allocation problem: U = {S1, . . . , Sn}, V =
⋃n
i=1 Si,
E = {Siv | v ∈ Si, i = 1, . . . , n}, and puv = pF,uv = 1 for each uv ∈ E. Let
kL = n and kF = k.
We fix a leader’s mixed strategy as x = χU . We denote z be an all-one-vector.
To evaluate fBR(x), it is necessary to know maxy∈DF g(x, y) since fBR(x) = |V | −
maxy∈DF g(x, y).
We show that there exists S ′ that covers at least α elements if and only if g(x, y) ≥
α for some y ∈ DF . By construction, we have g(x, y) =
∑
v∈V PF,v(y). In addition,
PF,v(y) = 1 if v is covered by some set S with yS = 1, and PF,v(y) = 0 otherwise.
Thus, g(x, y) =
∣
∣
∣
⋃
S∈supp(y) S
∣
∣
∣.
Then, if S ′ ⊆ S that covers at least α elements, then y ∈ DF attains g(x, y) ≥ α,
where y is defined by yS = 1 if S ∈ S ′ and yS = 0 otherwise. Conversely, if y satisfies
g(x, y) ≥ α, then supp(y) covers at least α elements. This completes the proof.
5 Algorithms for non-disjoint customers
In this section, for the non-disjoint customers setting, which has no assumption about
the graph structure, we propose two types of algorithms for (2). Let G be a game
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instance created from an instance φ = (G = (U, V ;E), {puv}uv∈E , {pF,uv}uv∈E ,
kL, kF ) and let Λ be its data size. Due to the hardness result (Theorem 4.5), in this
section we assume that kF is a constant.
5.1 Approximation algorithm via zero-sum game
We shall approximately solve a game G by solving a zero-sum game close to G. The
core idea of constructing such a zero-sumgame is to keep the same set of best-responses
of the follower for any strategy of the leader as G. Let us focus on the structure of f
and g, which include the term −
∑
v∈V Pv(x)PF,v(y) and its negation, respectively.
We define a utility function for the leader as
Φ(x, y) = −g(x, y) +
∑
v∈V Pv(x)
=
∑
v∈V [Pv(x)(1 − PF,v(y))− Pv(y)(1 − Pv(x))].
Note thatC := maxy∈DF
∑
v∈V Pv(y) ≥ −Φ(x, y) and we can computeC in polyno-
mial time since |DF | is polynomially bounded. Let GΦ be a zero-sum game (DL, DF ,Φ,
−Φ).
For reals α ∈ [0, 1] and ǫ ≥ 0, we call an algorithm (α, ǫ)-approximation for G
(resp. GΦ) if it provides a strategy profile (x′, y′) such that y′ ∈ BR(x′) and f(x′, y′) ≥
α ·maxx∈DL fBR(x) − ǫ (resp. Φ(x
′, y′) ≥ α ·maxx∈DL,y∈BR(x)Φ(x, y) − ǫ). Such
(x′, y′) is called an (α, ǫ)-approximate solution.
Lemma 5.1. Let (x′, y′) be an (α, ǫ)-approximate solution of a zero-sum game GΦ,
and let (x∗, y∗) be a strong Stackelberg equilibrium of the original game G. Let ǫ1 :=∑
v∈V (1 − Pv(x
′))Pv(y
′) and ǫ2 :=
∑
v∈V (1 − Pv(x
∗))Pv(y
∗). Then (x′, y′) is an
(α, αǫ2 − ǫ1 + ǫ)-approximate solution for the game G.
Proof. We remark that f(x, y) can be rewritten by Φ(x, y) as f(x, y) = Φ(x, y) +∑
v∈V (1 − Pv(x))Pv(y). Let (x˜, y˜) be the minimax strategy of GΦ. We have
f(x′, y′) = Φ(x′, y′) + ǫ1 ≥ αΦ(x˜, y˜)− ǫ+ ǫ1
≥ αΦ(x∗, y∗)− ǫ+ ǫ1 = αf(x
∗, y∗)− (αǫ2 − ǫ1 + ǫ),
where the second inequality holds byΦ(x˜, y˜) = maxx∈DL,y∈BR(x)Φ(x, y) ≥ Φ(x
∗, y∗).
To find an approximate strong Stackelberg equilibrium, it suffices to find an approx-
imate minimax strategy for GΦ. Note that since |SL| is an exponential size, finding a
minimax strategy for GΦ is still intractable.
To this end, we use the multiplicative weight update method [2]. Based on this
method, Kawase and Sumita [9] showed that, for any nonnegative monotone submod-
ular functions h1, . . . , hν : {0, 1}n → R+ and ǫ > 0, there exists an algorithm that
finds a (1− 1/e− ǫ)-approximate solution ofmaxx∈DL mini∈[ν] Es∼x[hi(s)] in poly-
nomial time in n, ν and 1/ǫ. We set hy(z) = Φ(z, y) + C for all pure strategies
z ∈ SL and y ∈ DF . By the definition, hy is nonnegative monotone submodular for
any y ∈ DF . Thus, we see that we can compute a (1− 1/e− ǫ)-approximate solution
formaxx∈DL miny∈DF (Φ(x, y) + C) in polynomial time in Λ and 1/ǫ. This solution
is
(
1−1/e−ǫ, (1/e+ǫ)C
)
-approximate for GΦ. Therefore, by Lemma 5.1, we observe
the following result.
Theorem 5.2. For any ǫ > 0, there exists a (1− 1/e− ǫ, β)-approximation algorithm
where β = (1 − 1/e)ǫ2 − ǫ1 + (1/e + ǫ)C and the running time is polynomial with
respect to Λ and 1/ǫ.
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Algorithm 1: Proposed heuristic
input: a parameter ℓ ∈ Z+ output: a mixed strategy
1 x, x∗ ← χ∅;
2 for i = 1 to ℓ do
3 S ← ∅;
4 for j = 1 to kL do
5 xu ← i−1
i
x+ 1
i
χS∪{u} (u ∈ U);
6 r ∈ argmaxu∈U\S fBR(x
u);
7 if fBR(x
r) ≥ fBR(x) then S ← S ∪ {r} ;
8 else break;
9 x← i−1
i
x+ 1
i
χS ;
10 if fBR(x
∗) < fBR(x) then x
∗ ← x ;
11 return x∗;
5.2 Heuristic algorithm
In this subsection, we propose a heuristic algorithm. Intuitively, in the algorithm, the
players fictitiously play a game ℓ times. Here ℓ is a parameter. Let us assume that the
leader would know that the follower estimates the leader’s mixed strategy by observing
the past budget allocations. In every phase, the leader needs to allocate her budgets so
that the mixed strategy estimated by the follower maximizes the leader’s utility. The
algorithm outputs a mixed strategy by repeating this phase ℓ times.
We describe informally our algorithm, which is summarized in Algorithm 1. The
algorithm repeatedly computes ℓ pure strategies χS1 , . . . , χSℓ ∈ DL, and outputs the
best mixed strategy among 1
i
(χS1 + · · · + χSi) (i = 1, . . . , ℓ). At first round, χS1 is
chosen to maximize fBR(x). Each χSi is computed greedily (lines 4–9).
In each round i, we evaluate fBR O(n · kL) times, and each evaluation of fBR takes
O(|DF | · |E| · i) time. Thus the total running time is O(|DF | · |E| · n · kL · ℓ
2).
6 Algorithm for disjoint customers
In this section, we focus on the disjoint customers setting where each customer is in-
terested in only one medium, i.e., |Nv| = 1 for all v ∈ V . This means that the utility
functions f, g are bilinear. In this special case, we propose an LP-based algorithm, and
modify it so that it runs fast when |DF | is small. We denote by Λ the data size of an in-
put game instance (G, {puv}uv∈E, {pF,uv}uv∈E , kL, kF ). The following proposition
is the main result in this section.
Proposition 6.1. When |Nv| = 1 for all v ∈ V , we can find a strong Stackelberg
equilibrium (x, y) in polynomial time with respect to |DF | and Λ.
As we will see in Section 6.1, it is easy to compute a strong Stackelberg equilibrium
by a multiple LP formulation. The running time is polynomial with respect to λ, |SL|,
and |DF |. However, this is not sufficient since |SL| could be exponentially large with
respect to λ and |DF |. To remove the dependency on |SL|, we reduce the size of each
LP in Section 6.2. The idea is a projection of a leader’s mixed strategy x ∈ [0, 1]SL
onto a fractional budget allocation r ∈ [0, 1]U .
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6.1 Multiple LP formulation
We first describe a simple exact algorithm to solve (2). The problem (2) is rewritten as
max f(x, y)
s.t. x ∈ DL,
g(x, y) ≥ g(x, y′) ∀y′ ∈ DF .
(3)
When we fix y = y∗, LP (3) is equivalent to the following LP:
max
∑
z∈SL
f(z, y∗)xz
s.t.
∑
z∈SL
(g(z, y∗)− g(z, y′))xz ≥ 0 ∀y′ ∈ DF ,∑
z∈SL
xz = 1,
xz ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ SL.
(4)
The simple algorithm solves (3) exactly by solving (4) for each y∗ ∈ DF . Each LP
(4) is solvable in polynomial time with respect to Λ, |SL| and |DF |, and the algorithm
produces |DF | instances of LP (4). Thus this algorithm runs in polynomial time with
respect to Λ, |SL|, and |DF |.
6.2 Reduced formulation
Let A be a matrix in {0, 1}U×SL whose rows are all pure strategies. For notational
convenience, we denote p′uv = puv−pF,uv for each uv ∈ E. We denote by a fractional
budget allocation r ∈ [0, 1]U with
∑
u∈U ru ≤ kL. We remark that a fractional budget
allocation is a different notion from a mixed strategy x ∈ DL; the former is uniquely
defined from the latter as ru =
∑
S:u∈S xS (u ∈ U), but the converse may not hold.
We first observe thatA projects a mixed strategy x to a fractional budget allocation
Ax ∈ [0, 1]U . Let Q = {r ∈ [0, 1]U | r = Ax, x ∈ DL}.
Lemma 6.2. For any vector z, it holds that z ∈ Q if and only if
0 ≤ z ≤ 1,
∑
u∈U zu ≤ kL. (5)
Proof. For any set S of media, we define q(S) = min{|S|, kL}. It is not difficult to
see that a vector z is in Q if and only if z satisfies
∑
u∈S zu ≤ q(S) (∀S ⊆ U), z ≥ 0. (6)
Moreover, z satisfies (6) if and only if it satisfies (5). The only-if part is clear. To see
the if part, assume that
∑
u∈S zu ≤ q(S) for some S. If |S| ≥ kL, then it holds that
1⊤z ≥
∑
u∈S zu > q(S) = kL. Otherwise, i.e., |S| < kL, since
∑
u∈S zu > |S|, we
have zu > 1 for some u ∈ S.
We can rewrite Pv and PF,v as Pv(z) = puvzu and PF,v(y) = pF,uvyu, where u is
the only neighbor of v. Then f and g are simplified as
f(x, y) =
∑
u∈U
∑
v∈Nu
puv(Ax)u(1− pF,uvyu),
g(x, y) =
∑
u∈U
∑
v∈Nu
puvyu (1− p′uv(Ax)u) .
The utility functions f(x, y) and g(x, y) are bilinear. Moreover, they depend on a
fractional budget allocation Ax ∈ [0, 1]U rather than x.
10
Lemma 6.3. Assume that |Nv| = 1 for all v ∈ V . For each x ∈ DL and y ∈ DF ,
it holds that f(x, y) = f(x′, y) and g(x, y) = g(x′, y) for any x ∈ DL such that
Ax = Ax′.
This lemma gives us an intuition that we solve (4) for a fractional budget allocation
r and recover a mixed strategy x. We claim that LP (4) is polynomially equivalent to
max
∑
u∈U
∑
v∈Nu
puv(1− pF,uvy∗u)ru
s.t.
∑
u∈U
∑
v∈Nu
puvy
′
ur
′
u ≥ 0,
y′u = y
∗
u − yu ∀u ∈ U, y ∈ DF ,
r′u = 1− p
′
uvru ∀u ∈ U,∑
u∈U ru ≤ kL,
ru ∈ [0, 1] ∀u ∈ U.
(7)
Indeed, if (x, y) is an optimal solution for (4), then we obtain an optimal solution (r, y)
for (7) by setting r = Ax. Conversely, let (r, y) be any optimal solution for (7). We
observe that r ∈ Q by Lemma 6.2. If we can construct a mixed strategy x ∈ DL such
that r = Ax, then we see that (x, y) is an optimal solution for (4) by Lemma 6.3. In
the following, we show that we can recover x ∈ DL such that r = Ax in polynomial
time with respect to Λ.
Lemma 6.4. For any r∗ ∈ Q, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a
mixed strategy x ∈ DL such that | supp(x)| ≤ n+ 1 and r∗ =
∑
z∈supp(x) xzz.
Note that the mixed strategy x in the statement always exists by Carathe´odory’s
theorem. Lemma 6.4 holds even if some |Nv| is not necessarily equal to one. A leader’s
strategy in a Stackelberg equilibrium may have the support of a large size.
To show Lemma 6.4, we use a result by Gro¨tschel et al. [5]. The separation problem
for Q is the problem that receives a vector r∗ and either asserts r∗ ∈ Q or finds a
hyperplane a⊤r = b such that a⊤r∗ > b and a⊤r ≤ b (∀r ∈ Q).
Theorem 6.5 (Gro¨tschel et al. [5]). If the separation problem for Q can be solved in
polynomial time, then there is a polynomial time algorithm that, on any input r∗ ∈ Q,
computes n + 1 pure strategies z1, . . . , zn+1 and coefficients λ1, . . . , λn+1 ≥ 0 such
that r∗ =
∑n+1
i=1 λiz
i and
∑n+1
i=1 λi = 1.
Proof of Lemma 6.4. By Lemma 6.2, the separation problem for Q can be solved in
polynomial time as follows. We check the feasibility of the 2n+ 1 inequalities in (5).
If yes, then we assert z∗ ∈ Q; otherwise, output any inequality that is not satisfied by
z∗.
Then by Theorem 6.5, we obtain a mixed strategy x by setting xzi = λi (i =
1, . . . , n+1) and other elements are zero. This strategy x needs memory of polynomial
size with respect to Λ.
Therefore, we can solve (3) by solving (7) and recovering a mixed strategy x ∈ DL
for each y∗ ∈ DF . This algorithm generates |DF | instances of LP (7) and each instance
can be solved in polynomial time in Λ and |DF |. Note that the data size of the LP (7) is
bounded by polynomial inΛ and |DF |. The recoveredmixed strategy x has polynomial
size in Λ. By summarizing the above arguments, Proposition 6.1 is proved.
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7 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed approximation algorithm
and the heuristic algorithm on real-world datasets. We execute the approximation al-
gorithm Approx (the algorithm based on MWU described in Section 5.1 with 100 it-
erations and ǫ = 0.5), and the heuristic algorithm Prop. (Algorithm 1 with ℓ = 10).
We compare the above algorithms with a baseline algorithm Greedy, which greedily
chooses kL media to maximize
∑
v∈V Pv(z). We conduct a series of experiments on
Movielens [6] and Yahoo! webscope [19] datasets to examine the leader’s utility. The
dataset MovieLens is constructed fromMovieLens 100KDataset1 with 100,000 ratings
(1 to 5) to 1,700 movies by 1,000 users. From the dataset, we select top n frequently
rated movies and constructed a bipartite graph G with n = 20 media (movies) and
m = 844 customers (users) with |E| = 3506 edges. The dataset Yahoo! Webscope
is constructed from Yahoo! Search Marketing Advertiser Bidding Data2, which con-
tains a bipartite graph between 1,000 search keywords and 10,475 accounts, where
each edge represents one bid to advertisement on the keyword with the bid price. From
the dataset, we select top n frequently bidden keywords and constructed a bipartite
graph G, which has n = 50 media (keywords) and m = 447 customers (accounts)
with |E| = 871 edges. U(a, b) denotes an uniform distribution with maximum and
minimum values a and b. For the above bipartite graphs, we set each basic activation
probability as puv ∈ U(0, 0.2) for uv ∈ E as in Wilder and Vorobeychik [18]. We
generate two types of instances; for each edge uv ∈ E, the activation probability pF,uv
is drawn from a distribution DF = U(0, 0.2) in the first type of instances, whereas
that is drawn from a distributionDF = U(0.1, 0.9) in the second type of instances that
models a scenario where the follower aims to take customers away from the leader.
We set the leader’s budget as kL = 1, 2, 4, whereas the follower’s budget is set to be
kF = 2. The results reported in Table 1 indicate that our algorithms clearly outperform
Greedy especially when the follower is eager to strip the leader of her customers; that
is, when DF = U(0.1, 0.9).
8 Conclusion
We formalized a new model called the Stackelberg budget allocation game with a
bipartite influence model. For the general case of our model, we proposed two al-
gorithms: an approximation algorithm which has provable guarantee and a heuristic
algorithm empirically outputs a better solution. We remark that, to the best of our
knowledge, our approximation algorithm is the first algorithm with a provable guar-
antee for the non-zero sum submodular Stackelberg game. When the utility functions
are bilinear, we proposed our LP-based algorithm and showed that it runs in polyno-
mial time when the follower’s budget is constant. We remark that in this case, we
can generalize the budget constraint to a matroid constraint and show a similar result.
Finally, experimental results indicate that our approximation and heuristic algorithms
empirically output good quality solutions especially in the setting that the follower is a
powerful competitor.
1http://grouplens.org/datasets/movielens/100k/
2https://webscope.sandbox.yahoo.com/catalog.php?datatype=a
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Table 1: Results averaged over 30 instances for real-world datasets.
MovieLens ((n,m, |E|) = (20, 844, 3506))
DF (kL, kF ) Greedy Approx Prop.
U( 0, 0.2) (1, 2) 37.05 37.05 37.05
U( 0, 0.2) (2, 2) 65.10 65.10 65.24
U( 0, 0.2) (4, 2) 114.22 114.22 114.22
U(0.1, 0.9) (1, 2) 14.34 14.55 17.22
U(0.1, 0.9) (2, 2) 24.22 29.97 31.87
U(0.1, 0.9) (4, 2) 54.46 54.46 56.12
Yahoo! Webscope ((n,m, |E|) = (50, 447, 871))
DF (kL, kF ) Greedy Approx Prop.
U( 0, 0.2) (1, 2) 5.42 5.42 5.46
U( 0, 0.2) (2, 2) 10.68 10.68 10.72
U( 0, 0.2) (4, 2) 19.56 19.56 19.55
U(0.1, 0.9) (1, 2) 2.20 3.00 3.67
U(0.1, 0.9) (2, 2) 5.03 6.36 7.05
U(0.1, 0.9) (4, 2) 11.72 12.68 13.31
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